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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
COURTS-USE OF STATE HIGHWAY HELD NO
WAIVER OF FEDERAL VENUE STATUTE
Plaintiff, a resident of Iowa, brought an action in a federal district
court in Pennsylvania against residents of North Carolina, for damages
resulting from a motor vehicle accident which occurred in Pennsylvania.
Service was made following the provisions of a Pennsylvania statute which
provides that a non-resident motorist constitutes the Secretary of Revenue
his agent for service in courts of the Commonwealth when he uses its high-
ways.' The defendant maintained that venue was lacking because the
federal statute provides that: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is
founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs
or all defendants reside. ' ' 2 It was held that not withstanding the Pennsyl-
vania non-residence motorist statute, mere operation of a motor vehicle on
Pennsylvania highways did not constitute a waiver of the federal venue
statute. McCoy v. Siler, 205 F. 2d 498 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
This is the most recent of several decisions3 which limit, if they do not
reverse, the hitherto well established principle upon which this class of
cases has been decided. 4 Ever since 1877 when the United States Supreme
Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute which required foreign corporations
to designate a state official as agent for service of process, the principle
that such an appointment "waives" the federal statute has been expanded.5
In the case of Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,6 it was held
that the defendant waived the provisions of the federal act by designating
a state officer to receive service of process. It was also pointed out that
the privileges of the federal act may be lost by failure to assert it season-
ably, by formal submission to a cause, or by submission through conduct.
In the present case the precise question was whether or not the de-
fendant's conduct, in using the highways of the Commonwealth con-
stituted submission to a loss of privilege under the act.
1 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1929) Title 75, S 1201.
262 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a) (1950).
3 Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co., 183 F. 2d 53 (C.A. Ist, 1950); Moss v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 149 F. 2d 701 (C.A. 2d, 1945); Cumner-Graham Co. v. Straight
Side Basket Corp., 136 F. 2d 828 (C.A. 9th, 1943); Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F. Supp. 651
(E.D. Tenn., 1950).
4 Consult Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788, 791 (C.A. 2d, 1948) where
Learned Hand, J. writes, "It is settled that . . . a state may give judgment in personam
against a non-resident who has only passed through its territory, if the judgment be
based upon a liability incurred while he was within its borders .... The presence of
the obligor within the state subjects him to its law ... and allows it to impose upon
him any obligation which its law entails upon his conduct."
5 Ex Parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877).
6308 U.S. 165 (1939).
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The reasoning that such conduct should constitute submission to a loss
of privilege, is based upon the legal fiction that every man is conclusively
presumed to know the law. If the law of a state obliges him to appoint a
state official as his agent for service when he enters upon its roads, he
should be deemed to know it. His voluntary entry, therefore, is submission
through conduct.7 A more practical reason, however, is that witnesses are
more likely to be available in the locale, and that depositions are unsatis-
factory substitutes for the trier of the facts.8
The view that mere operation of a motor vehicle on a state's highways is
not submission through conduct is exemplified by the decision in Martin
v. Fischbach Trucking Co.,9 from which the Neirbo case was distinguished
on the grounds that the defendant therein made an actual designation of a
state official for service. This view was followed in Waters v. Plyborn,10
and by the majority in the instant case. If this view were to be followed
uniformly it would seem that only an express appointment of a state official
for the purpose of receiving service would be effective to waive the fed-
eral statute.
Whether one interpretation, or the other, of non-resident motorist
statutes is to prevail, it is a matter of some importance to litigants that the
interpretation be uniform throughout the country. Interstate automobile,
truck, and bus travel is a commonplace affair, and in the actions arising
from such travel, the forum for trying them should be certain. Otherwise,
much needless litigation concerning venue will result.
Since the first non-resident motorist act in 1923, enacted by Massachu-
setts," was held constitutional,12 every state in the union and the District
of Columbia have enacted similar statutes.'8 Federal and state courts have
almost uniformly upheld them.' 4 Hess v. Pawloski'5 definitely confirmed
the power of the states to require the appointment of a state official for
service, and to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant non-
resident motorist. This power was qualified in Wuchter v. Pizzutti'6 by
7 Cases cited notes 27-29 infra.
8 Burnett v. Swenson, 95 F. 2d 524 (W.D. Okla., 1951).
9 183 F. 2d 53 (C.A. 1st, 1950).
1093 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tenn., 1950).
11 Mass. Acts (1923) C. 431, § 2.
12 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
13 Consult McCoy v. Siler, 205 F. 2d 498, 502 n. 18 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
14 Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. 2d 365 (N.D. Tex., 1932); Cohen v. Plutschak, 40 F. 2d
727 (D.C. N.J., 1930); Moore v. Payne, 35 F. 2d 232 (W.D. La., 1929); Jones v. Paxton,
27 F. 2d 364 (D.C. Minn., 1928); Shushereba v. Ames, 255 N.Y. 490, 175 N.E. 187
(1931); Ashley v. Brown, 198 N.C. 369, 151 S.E. 725 (1930); State ex. rel. Cronkhite
v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211 N.W. 916 (1927).
15 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
16 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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requiring that the statute must provide for actual notice to the defendant.
The power of the states to compel appointment was held to have been
part of their regulatory powers, because: "Motor vehicles are dangerous
machines; and ... their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and
properties.' 17
In contradistinction to the grounds on which the non-resident motorist
acts were upheld, are the grounds on which the states were upheld in
requiring foreign corporations, doing business within'the state, to appoint
agents, whether state officials or not, for receiving service of process.
These grounds were said to be the qualified power to exclude the corpora-
tions from the state.' 8
In an early case, 19 it was said that the mere transaction of business in a
state by non-resident natural persons does not imply consent to be bound
by the processes of its courts. It is clear that the first thinking on this
subject was to the effect that the state could exercise its power to acquire
in personam jurisdiction of a non-resident within its boundaries, but that
no implication of the non-resident's submission through conduct or
waiver of personal immunities arose. Later, the Neirbo case made the
whole question one of public policy, saying that it would be intolerable to
afford immunity to corporations doing business in other states outside of
those in which such corporations had been created or recognized. Krueger
v. Hider'2 0 followed Neirbo and went even further, holding that no ex-
press appointment of an agent for service is necessary, but that such ap-
pointment will be implied from the non-resident's activities.
2
'
In the Schollenberger case it was held that the intention of the Pennsyl-
vania legislature in requiring foreign corporations to appoint agents for
service was to have these cases not confined to courts of the state, but
courts in the state, where the laws of the state would apply. This follows
the Supreme Court in decisions from 1856,22 and was further expounded
by the court in Neirbo, as follows: "As to diversity cases, Congress has
given the federal courts cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several states."'2 3
It may therefore be reasoned that the appointment of a state official for
service, by a non-resident motorist, waives the privilege of venue (or
17 Ibid., at 356.
18 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93
(1917).
19 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
20 48 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. S.C., 1943).
21 See, for discussion of subject "submission through conduct," Steele v. Dennis,
62 F. Supp. 73 (D.C. Md., 1945).
22 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1856).
23308 U.S. 165, 171 (1939).
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alternatively gives consent to be sued) 24 because the non-resident must be
deemed to understand the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal courts and
state courts, and to be prepared to answer in either. That anyone may ex-
pressly waive his personal immunity is beyond argument, 25 but that he
may do so by implication is not conceived in the present case and its
several predecessors. 26
There are, however, some District courts and one Court of Appeals
which have had no hesitancy in applying the rule in the Neirbo case to the
cases in point, and finding that the defendant waived his privilege by sub-
mission through conduct. Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co. 27 held that the
out-of-state motorists had consented to be sued in Pennsylvania, and that
the District Court was in Pennsylvania. Kostamo v. Brorby28 found that by
the mere use of a Nebraska road, the non-resident motorist waived the fed-
eral rule. There are many cases to the same effect.29
In Jacobson v. Schuman,"° it was said:
To say that the court may retain jurisdiction [if justice requires] even though
the venue is improper, would stretch section 1391 too far. But this is what the
courts have done through legal fiction, [which] is dangerous in a country of
realistic men and women.31
It is submitted that the final determination of this split of opinion in the
federal courts is not the most pressing matter deserving resolution by the
Supreme Court of the United States but until it is resolved much needless
litigation will result.
CARRIERS-DUTY OF CARRIER TO NOTIFY CON-
SIGNOR OF NON-DELIVERY IN "ORDER-
NOTIFY" SITUATION
Plaintiff-consignor brought an action based on counts in tort and breach
of contract against the terminal carrier of goods shipped on an "order-
notify" bill of lading for failure of the carrier to notify consignor of
24 "Whether such surrender of a personal immunity be conceived negatively as a
waiver or positively as a consent to be sued, is merely an expression of literary prefer-
ence." Ibid., at 168.
2562 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (b) (1950).
26 Cases cited note 3 supra.
27 109 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa., 1953).
28 95 F. Supp. 806 (D.C. Nebr., 1951).
29 Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 201 F. 2d 582 (C.A. 6th, 1953); Garcia v.
Frausto, 97 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo., 1951); Urso v. Scales, 90 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa.,
1950); Canright v. General Finance Corp., 33 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ill., 1940).
80 105 F. Supp. 483 (D.C. Vt., 1952).
31 Ibid., at 486.
